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NOTE AND COMMENT.
PoWER

Ol

THE GOViNOR GrENERAL TO EXPEL RESIDENT ALIENS FROM THE IN-

suLAR TRRITORY O THE UNITED STATE.-In the case of Forbes et al. v. Chuoco Tiaco, decided! by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands July 30,
z91o, 8 Off. Gaz., p. 1778, some of the most interesting, important, and fundamental questions were presented and determined for the time being, but not
settled, it is reasonably safe to say until passed upon by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The questions involved were whether the Governor General
of the Philippine Islands has the power to expel resident Chinese aliens
without a hearing or an opportunity-to be heard, and whether the Governor,
if he exceeded his authority, and those who carried out his orders, 'were
civilly liable to the persons deported.
The facts were: August 19, i909, the Chiefs- of Police and Secret Service of the City of Manila, acting under the orders of Governor-General
Forbes, between 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening, withouto-a warrant, seized
Chuoco Tiaco, and eleven other persons of Chinese race, six of whom including Tiaco, were merchants and property owners in the Philippines where
they had residea from i6 to 35 years, and had wives and children, one having
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been president of the Chinese Chamber ot Commerce in Manila. They
were taken to the police station, deprived of their certificates of registration
and other documents required of Chinese persons, showing lawful residence
under the laws, hauled to the water front in a patrol wagon, placed in a
launch, and put on board a steamship and, under cover of darkness, after
the courts were closed, were shipped to China, without opportunity to say
farewell to their families, arrange their business, and without notice that any
charge of any kind had been made against them,
On March 29, x91%these six returned to Manila, and brought habeas
corpus proceedings in the Court of First Instance to secure their liberty;
the court took them into custody and held them until the immigration authorities passed upon their right to land; three were permitted to land as members of the exempt class by the immigration authorities, and three were not;
pending these proceedings the Governor ordered them all to be sent away
again, whereupon action was brought in the Court of First Instance by the
.three allowed to Jand against the Governor, Chief of Police, and Chief of
the Secret Service, praying for damages and an injunction against redeportation. A temporary injunction was issued; the defendants demurred on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction; the demurrer was overruled, and
instead of answering, the defendants applied to ihe Supreme Court for a
writ of prohibition, which was issued; the Court of First Instance issued
the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the other three excluded by the immigration authorities.
While the cases were pending on demurrer the Governor sent a message
to the Philippine Legislature saying, "In the exercise of the power vested
in me by Congress, as Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands," he caused
"the deportation of certain Chinamen whose antecedents, character
and conduct were such that said Chinamen were recognized as being undesirable
troublesome, and dangerous even by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, to
such an extreme that the deportation of the aforesaid Chinamen was then
urgently requested by the representative of His Imperial Chinese Majesty,
the Emperor of China, the Consul-General resident in Manila. After careful investigation I found that the allegations were reasonable and that the
presence of the said persons of Chinese nationality in the Philippines was
not only liable to result in serious harm to the Chinese colony, but that it
might and as the investigation showed, did constitute a serious menace to
public order and to the well-being of the whole community," and designated
this deportation as one of the subjects to be considered by them.
The Legislature thereupon, reciting the statements of the Governor's
message, passed an act, to the effect that "The action of the Governor-General is hereby approved, and ratified and confirmed and in all respects declared legal and not subject to question or review."
At the outset a question was raised whether the suit by the Chinamen
was against the defendants in their official, or in their personal, capacity.
The Court of First Instance held the latter. Three of the judges of the Supreme Court held the suit was against the defendants in their official capacity,
and two of them held it was only against them in their personal capacity,
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but all agreed in making the writ of prohibition permanent, and ordering
the-suit of the Chinamen dismissed.

Judge

JOHNSON

with whom

ARELLANO,

C.J., and ToRRES, J., concurred,

held: (I) That the Government of the United States in the Philippine
Islands is a government possessed with "all the military, civil, and judicial
powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands," and as such has the
power and duty, through its political department, to deport aliens whose
presence in the territory is found to be injurious to the public good and
domestic tranquility of the people.
(2)
That the Governor-General, acting in his political and executive capacity is invested with plenary power to deport aliens whose continued presence in the territory is found by him to be injurious to the public interest,
and in the absence of express and prescribed rules as to the method of deporting or expelling them he may use such methods as his official judgnrent
and good conscience may dictate.
(3) That this power to deport or expel obnoxious aliens being invested in
the political department of the Government, the judicial department will not,
in the absence of express legislation, intervene for the purpose of controlling
such power, nor for the purpose of inquiring whether or not he is liable in
damages for the exercise thereof.
The opinion of MORELAND, J., concurred in by TRENT, J., contains an
elaborate discussion of the personal liability of the Governor-General for
acts in excess of, or without, jurisdiction in the matter, "and concludes that
the same considerations of public policy which exempt judges of the courts
of superior jurisdiction from civil suits for damages for official acts should
apply to the Governor-General; that the test of judicial immunity is not
jurisdiction, but the exercise of judicial functions; that there is immunity,
if the judge is at the time exercising judicial functions, whether within, in
excess of, or entirely without, his jurisdiction, and whether he acts maliciously or corruptly or not; that whether a judge has jurisdiction is a question of law, and in determining this question, the judge necessarily exercises judicial functions,--o" in other words has jurisdiction to determine what
his judisdiction is; that the test of what is a judicial question is whether a
qualified judge can regard it as having two sides, or whether there is a real
question of law involved; and the test of judicial functions is whether twomen properly qualified, might really reach different results; but if the matter
is so clear that there is or can be no real question, or difference in conclu0sions, it is not a judicial; question or function; that whether the GovernorGeneril has authority to' expel aliens is a question of law, upon which 'two
qualified persons might easily differ; that he is obliged to determine the
question; in doing so he acts judicially, and should be protected-from civil
suit for damages; but the courts have authority to review his conclusions
and hold them illegal and void, and place as nearly as possible in status quo
one who has been deprived of his liberty or property by such act.
It will be noted that the majority opinion is based on these propositions:
(i) Every independent government has a right to expel aliens; (2) the
Philippine government is such; (3) the power is a political one; (4) it re-
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sides in the executive department, that is, the Governor-General; (5) if not,
his acts -can be ratified by the Legislature. We believe that (2), (4) and (5)
are More than doubtful.
In considering tese. opinions it is desirable to recall the principal facts
relating to the establishment of government of the United States in the
PhJ~ppines. April ig, 08, the United States Congress resolved, "That the
people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be, free and inde"pendent," demanded that Spain relinquish its authority over the island, and
authorized the President to use the military and naval forces of the United
StateS to carry this resolution into effect. Spain elected to go to war, and
Congress declared war, April 25, and directed the President as Commanderin-Chief to carry it on. (30 U. S. St. 364, 738); May i, Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manita Bay, and the City of Manila was captured August 13, by the naval forces of Dewey and the land forces under
General Merritt; by order of the President, May ig, General Merritt was to
be military governor with powers "absolute and supreme," but the municipal
laws were to remain in force and be administered by the same tribunals so
far as possible, as befbre occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation. December io, the treaty of Paris was signed by Spain
and. the United States, by which Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
United States, "the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants"
to be determined by the United States Congress, and the Senate resolved
that it was not intended "permanently to annex said islands as an integral
part of the territory pf the United States."
The Filipinos continued hostile, and military rule, exercising legislative,
executive, and judicial functions, continued until September x, igoo, when
by order of the President April 7, i9oo, a Philippine Commission.was created;
the Military Governor was to .continue to exercise "the executive authority
now possessed by him not expressly assigned to the Commission," subject
however to the order enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the legislative powers conferred upon them; these included various enumerated
things and "all other matters of a civil nature for which the Military Governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character," but upon "every branch of the government must be imposed these inviolable rules: that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. * * *"

March 2, igo, Congress enacted that "All military, civil and judicial
powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands shall * * * be vested in
such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President shall direct for the establishment of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion." On June 2r, .i9or, the President appointed W. H.
Taft, Civil Governor, after July 4, 1901, to exercise "the executive authority
in civil affairs," under and in conformity to the instructions *** dated
April 7, I9OO."

July i, i9o2, Congress enacted the Philippine Bill, approving

the creation of the Philippine Commission by the President, and authorizing
it.,to exercise "the powers of government to the extent and in the maimer
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and form and subject to the regulation and control. set forth in the instruc-tions" of April 7, igoo, and the creation of the office of Governor-General
"to exercise the powers to the extent and in the form set forth in the executive order dated June 21, i9oi." This bill also defines Philippine citizenship; contains a bill or rights, including the provision that "No law shall
be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, or deny to ani person therein the
equal protection of the laws;" provides for the organization of a Philippine
legislature, and a judiciary, with appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme
Court to the United States Supreme Court; also confers authority on the
government to do certain things, but all laws passed shall be zeported to
Congress, which reserves the power to annul the same.
Prior to the conquest and occupation, the Spanish Law of Foreigners of
i87o provided "The foreigners who reside in the Spanish provinces shall have
the right of security of their prsons" as established for Spaniards, which
by the Constitutions of 1869 and 1876, (not extended to the Philippines) required a judgment of a competent court to deport anyone. By royal order
of the King of Spain, August 2, i888, the Governors-General "have authority
to determine the legal convenience of deportation which they consider necessary for the preservation of public order," to be exercised only by the"
Governor-General himself (and not his subordinates) and subject to revocation by the Supreme Government. In Cuba where this constitutional provision was in effect, it had been held that such provision abrogated any
special power of the Governor to deport, and authorized the return of such
as had been deported. It was argued that the "due process" clause of the
President's order of April 7, I9oo, was equivalent to the promulgation of the
Spanish constitutional'provision. This view seems reasonable.
By Act of Congress of April 29, 19o2, the Chinese exclusion acts of the
United States were made applicable to the island territory, and required
every "Chinese lrborer other than d citizen, rightfully in, and entitled to
remain in any of the insular territory of the United States". to obtain within
a year "a certificate of residence in the insular territory wherein he resides,
which certificate shall entitle him to reside therein," and authorized tie Philippine Commission to make the rules necessary to enforce these provisions'
in those islands.
By the Immigration Act of February 20, .9o7,

alien idiots, insane, pau-

pers, diseased, criminals, etc., were excluded from the United States, including the Philippines, with power in the Secretary of Commerce and Labor,
when he "shall be satisfied that an alien has been found in the United States.
in violation of'this Act, or that an alien is subject to depoftation under the
provision.s of this Act or of any law of the United States, to cause such. alien
within the period of three years after lahding or entry therein to be taken
into custody and returnhd to the country whence he came."
By the donstitution of the United States, all legislative power is vested
in Congress,-to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; declare war;
make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested
-in the government or in any department or officer thereof; make all need-
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ful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
States; but the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures shall not be violated, and no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The executive power is vested in the President, who is to swear to faiihfully execute the office and preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution;
act as commander of the forces'when in actual service; make treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and take care that the Laws be faithfully executed. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity
arising under this Constitution, and the laws and treaties made thereunder,
and which are to be the supreme law of the land.
By the Insular Cases, th@ Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
the territory of the United States included: (i) States; (2) territory incorporated into the Union by declaration of Congress; and (3) territory appurtenant or annexed to the Union by conquest or treaty, but not incorporated
into the Union. All of the judges held that all the limitations of the powers
of Congress and the guaranties of the Constitution, extended over the States;
four of the judges held the same as to all the territory, whether incorporated
or appurtenant only; four others held that all the limitations and guarantieg
included the States and incorporated territory only, but there are certaift
"lim'itations of so fundamental character," as to restrain Congress in whatever capacity, or over whatsoever territory, it may be acting; the other judge
held that the constitutional limitations and guaranties extended in their full
vigor only over 'the states, but adrmits that there are some "prohibitions that
go to the very root of the power of Cdngress to act at all," and suggests
that-the right to personal liberty, due process of law, equal protection of the
laws, immunity from unreasonable seizures, are probably of this class.
(Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 241, 21 S. C. Rep. 770). In Hawaii v. Mankichi, 19o U. S. 197, 23 S. C. 787, it was held the provisions of the 5th and 6th
Amendments as to indictment by grand jury, and trial by petit jury, did not
apply to Hawaii, which had been annexed to the United States; and in Dorr
v. U. S., 195 U. S. 138, 24 S. C. Rep. 808, it was held that trial by jury was not
a necessary incident to due process of law in the Philippines.
From the foregoing it is reasonable to say that the "due process of law"
provisions, by the direction of the President, by authority of Congress, and
ex proprio rigore, extend over the territory and inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands. and have the same effect as in the United States. Weems v. U. S.,
217 U. S. 349.
While "due process of law" does not require judicial trial, and the decision of an administrative officer duly authorized by Congress to pass on
the matter, no abuse of authority being shown, may be final as to the status
of a particular individual, if depending on facts only, it will not be so if
depending on matter of law, and the courts will then review administrative
acts. Davies v. Manolis, 179 Fed. 8M8; U. S. v. Iu Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25
S. C. Rep. 6-14; U. S. v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279; Gonzales v. Williams, 192
U. S. i, 24 S. C. Rep. I71; Japanese Immigration Case, 189 U. S. 86. But
"due process of law" whether in court or before an administrative officer re-
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quires "notice and an opportunity to be heard," Garfield v. Goldsby,

kcGznmz,

211

U. S.

Dun PRocss op LAW, pp. 73-4In Wong Wing v. U. S., j63 U. S. 228, 237, it was said "No limits can be
put by the courts upon the power of Congress to protect, by summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them.
undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their
way into our land and unlawfully remain therein. But to declare unlawful
residence within the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivafion of liberty and property, would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should
first be established by a judicial trial." And as to -a Chinaman already lawfully domiciled in the United States, "while he lawfully remains here he is
entitled to the benefit of the guaranties of life, liberty, and property, secured to all persons of whatever race, within the jurisdiction of the U.nited
States. His personal rights when he is in this country are as fully protected
by the supreme law of the land as if he were a native or naturalized citizen
of the United States." Lem Moon Sing v. U. S., 158 U. S. 538, on 547.
Again by the Immigration Treaties of i88o, and 1894, Chinese then permanently residing in the United States, or lawfully there were to be protected as the subjects of the most favored nations. By the io-year exclusion
act of 1882, Chinese laborers who were here prior to i88o, were considered
to be lawfully here, as were domiciled Chinese merchants and those not
laborers, Lou Ow Bezw v. U. S., 144 U. S. 47; one brought before a United
States Court or Commissioner and found unlawfully in the United States
could be deported, but if tried by a Commissioner, he had a right of appeal
to the District Court. By Act of 1892, the exclusion was to continue for io
years more, the former laws were to continue in force, and any Chinese person arrested under any of these laws was to be deemed unlawfully in the
United States unless he could affirmatively prove otherwise, Le Sing v. U. S.,
iSo U. S. 486, 21 S. C. Rep. 449, but those lawfully in the United States at
the time were given six months to get certificates of that fact from the internal revenue collectors, and any Chinaman found to be unlawfully in the
United States was to be imprisoned at hard labor for a year, and then deported. In 19o2, these laws were continued in force ind made applicable
to the Philippines.
If this review is correct, then Congress has legislated on the subject of
exclusion of aliens, including Chinese, throughout the territory of the United
States, and no power is conferred upon the President or any officer anywhere, to deport a resident alien not unlawfully,-i.e., in violation of some of
the exclusion acts,-in the United States; there is no power conferred by
Congress upon anyone to deport any such, except that, under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, in time of war, and in case of actual or threatened invasion, the President by proclamation is authorized to direct the conduct to
be observed toward alien enemies, the restraint to be put upon them, and
to provide for the removal of such as are directed, but refuse, to depart.
Whether Congress itself has the power to direct alien friends, domiciled
and resident within the United States, coming under the comity of friendship
249.
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and good will, pursuing the peaceful pursuits of lawful business, to be
seized and deported without charge of violation of law, without notice, and
without opportunity to be heard, is more than doubtful. The only time when
such attempt has been made in our history was under the Alien Friends Law
of 1798, which with the sedition act of the same year, as Von Holsf says,
"Sealed the fate of the Federal party and gave rise to the doctrine of nullification." Even Hamilton said they "appear to me highly exceptionable * * *
Let us not establish a tyranny"; and they called forth the famous Kentucky
and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, the first framed by JxrrERSoN, and the
latter by MADISON.
This law conferred upon the President "power to send away all such
aliens as he judged dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,
or had reason to think were hatching treason or laying plots against the
government. Should- any one so ordered to depart be found at large, without license to remain, he might be imprioned for three years and could
never become a citizen. Aliens imprisoned in pursuance of the act were
sabject to removal from the country on the order of, the President, and on
voluntarily returning, to reimprisonment for such time as the President
might think the public good required." Aliens sent away were to be allowed
to carry their goods and chattels or dispose of them as they pleased. The
law was to last only two years. (MCMASTIR, HisT. or PEOPLE or U. S., Vol. I.,
P. 395.) It was never enforced.
Objections to it were: (I) It subverted the general principles of free
government; (2) it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the constitution;
(3) no power over alien friends was delegated to Congress, but they were
under the protection of the states wherein they dwelt; (4) the migration
of persons fhat the states think fit to admit was not to be prohibited by Congress prior to i8o8; (5) imprisonment without accusation, hearing, trial by
jury, confronting accusers, or attendance of witnesses, for failing to obey
the President's order to depart, deprived such persons of their liberty without
due process of Jaw.
These were answered by the Federalist Committee of the House of Representatives: (I) The migration provision was to prevent Congress from
abolishing the slave trade prior to i8o8, and not to prevent the exclusion of
aliens in general; (2) but if not, exclusion of alien immigrants was one
thing, but "to send off, after arrival, emigrants who were dangerous to the
peace and safety of the country was quite another thing"; such construction
would deny the right of Congress of "driving from the soil a band of men
who with arms in their hands had come to invade it"; (3) as to jury trials
it was said: the Constitution was made for citizens, not aliens; they had no
rights under it; they merely lived in the country and enjoyed the benefit of
the laws, not as a right, but as a favor, and this could be recalled at will; jury
trials apply to crimes, and removing an alien was neither committing nor punishing such. (McMASTER, HIsT, PEoPLE or U. S., Vol. I., p. 417 et seq.)
The second reason is similar to Judge JOHNSON'S in the case under review. He says: "Suppose, for example, that some of the inhabitants of the
thickly populated countries situated near the Philippines should suddenly
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decide to enter, and should without warning appear in one of the remote
harbors, and at once land for the purpose of stirring up the inhabitants and
inciting dissensions against the present Government. And suppose that the
Legislature was not in session; could it be denied that the Governor-General,
under. his general political powers to protect the very existence of the Government has the power to take such steps as he may deem wise and necessary for the purpose of ridding the country of such obnoxious and dangerous
foreigners ?"

I Many Federalists believed this Alien Act valid; the Anti-Federalists believed otherwise; St. George Tucker declares it invalid (Tucxig's BLAKsTONx, Vol. I, p. 30); Judge STORy and Judge CooLrY are non-committal
(Coo XY's SroRY'S CONST. LAW, § 1294), but VoN -HoLsT says "for a long
time, they (the Alidn and Sedition laws) have been considered in the United
States as unquestionably unconstitutional." (CONsTr. Hisr., Vol. I., p. 142).
The courts did not pass on them.
The foregoing relates to the power of Congress to confer such power on
the President; and if Congress has no such power to confer, much less
would it.exist in him or in any officer, unless it inheres in the nature of his
office; but if so, it is also subject to the due process provisions of the Constitution, for'no department of our government is above the Constitution.
It is not doubted that by the law of nations every sovereign and independent nation has the inherent and inalienable right to expel alien friends
subject only to the constitutional restraints it has, placed- upon itself, Fong
Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 709. This power is vested in the political department of the government, regulated by treaty or Act of Corgress (with
us), executed by the executive authority, without interference by the judicial authority except so far as treaty, statute, or constitutional provision requires. Ekiu v. U. S., 142 U. S. 651; Turner v. Williams, i9 U. S.279; U.
S_ v. Ju Toy, i98 U. S. 253; Chin Yow v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. 8.) WILLOUGHBY,
C6NsT. LAW, p. 253. But any arbitrary expulsion may give rise to a diplomatic claim for relief. (Moore, Digest Int. L., § 55o.)
In England resident alien friends so long as they behave peaceably, are
under the .King's protection "though liable to be sent .home whenever fhe
King sees occasion." (I BL- COM., p. 26o), but all merchants, by the Great
Charter of John (c.4') shall have a right to come and stay in England for
the exercise of trade, except in time of war, in the Charter of Henry III.
(c.,3o) the same right was continued, "unless publicly prohibited beforehanud,"
which public prohibition must be made by Parliament according to Lord
COXI (2 Inst. c. 3o). So too no freeman was to be exiled except by the
law of the land; the Crown has not exercised this right of expulsion
since 1575. During the French Revolution, in f793, Parliament passed an
Alien Act authorizing the' Secretary of State to remove such French refugees. as were suspected of conspiracies against the Government, and during
the disturbances of 1848 a similar act was passed authorizing the executive
to remove foreigners considered dangerous to the public peace, but the power,
in neither case, was exercised. Both acts were to last for one year but the
first was renewed from time to time till x826. (TAsw=LL-LANGM4AD ENGLISH
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CONST. HIsT., p. 667 note; LAWS OF ENGLAND, Ed. by LORD HALSBURY,
Vol. I.,

p. -320, ff 705; Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy [I891] A. C. 272.) Under the
present law of England, the Secretary of State may order an alien out of
the country if a court (including a court of summary jurisdiction) certifies
he has been convicted of a crime, -and recommends expulsion, or if such
court, after proceedings taken for the purpose within 12 months after the
alien last entered the United Kingdom, certifies that the alien is destitute,
vagrant,.lives in crowded and unsanitary conditions, or has been elsewhere
convicted of crime.
In England, the Crown enjo 's the sole right, in his absolute aiscretion,
acting upon the advice of his cabinet to make treaties, declare war and peace,
unfettered by direct supervision by Parliament or otherwise,-subject in recent years to the convention that foreign relations will conform to the wishes
of Parliament. THE LAws OF ENGLAND, Vol. 6, CONsT,. LAW, p. 427.) The
President of the United States has no such prerogative, and much less the
Governors of the states and territories.
In colonies before representative legislatures have been granted the Crown
has the prerogative right of establishing laws, but not such as are contrary
"to the fundamental principles of the British Constitution, or exempting
them from the power of Parliament, and every colony is subject to the paramount authority of the Imperial Parliament." (LAws OF ENGLAND, Vol. 6,
P. 423). In Canada, (Const. 91 [25]) ; Australia (5I, XIX), and South Af.
rica (139) -some power is conferred by their constitutions to legislate on
naturalization and aliens, but the Naturalization Act of i87o (33 & 34 Vict.
c. 4) ; is controlling in many respects in the colonies. (WooLsEY, COMPARATIVX STUDY OF SOUTH ArRIcA- CoNsv., Am. J. Int. Law,
Jan., 19o, p. So.) In
the colonies the colonial legislatures have of course such powers as the King
by his prerogative can exercise, or has authorized, (Attorney General v. Cain,
H. L. App. Cas. 19o6, p. 545) or Parliament has bestowed upon them (Hodge
v. Reg., 9 App. Cas. 117), neither of which is limited by "due process of law"
provisions of the Federal 'constitution.
Prior to the revolution the American Colonies enacted laws regulating
the admission of aliens; this power continued in the States under the Confederation; the regulations were so diverse that Madison proposed a uniform rule as early as 1782. It was natural, therefore, to confer such power
on Congress under the Constitution. While it was at first considc d that
this power was concurrent with that of the State (Collet v. G Let, 2 Dallas
294) yet it has long been settled that the power of naturalizationis exclusively vested in Congress, (VAN DYNE, NATURALIZATION, p. 6), and it would
seem also that under the treaty making power vested in the United States,
that the States cannot admit or keep, those -whom the Federal Government
excludes, although in the absence of exclusion acts of Congress the States
may undoubtedly admit whom tiey please, though probably not expel those
whom the Federal Government admits. WILLOUGHBY, CoNsr. LAW, §§ 122-5,
128-132.)

It would seem from this that Congress has not and probably cannot, nor
has ar can the President, confer oh the Philippine Legislature or the Gover-
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